Dear God I knew someone would finally pull out the BS Army Generals propaganda. Good job - ph30usmc.
All US Army generals give pep talks to US Army and marine units alike. The only difference is that the Marines record it and keep it for record to bash the other branches. What a joke.
Here is more updated stuff.
When George Bush the second launched the US invasion of Iraq, the Marines were once again included, and this time the goal was Baghdad. The invasion, which began on March 20th, 2003, called for a two-pronged assault on Baghdad.
The Army’s 5th Corps would advance from the desert west of the Euphrates river, while the First Marine Division was ordered to cross the Euphrates and make a parallel advance through central Iraq.
The invasion did not go well for the Marines. In several cities, including Umm al Qasr and Nasiriya, their units suffered heavy casualties fighting remnants of the Iraqi Army and fedayeen guerrillas. Since the Marines had fewer
armored vehicles, and they were exposed to a more tenacious enemy, their progress was slower than the Army’s.
Major General Mattis, the commanding general of the Marines in Iraq, was not pleased. He repeatedly pressured his regiments to make greater speed, and this pressure grew more intense as the Marines lagged further behind Army units.
On the morning of April 3, the First Marine Regiment, commanded by Colonel Dowdy, was ordered to drive to the town of al-Kut.
The city was another choke point, where Iraqi fedayeen guerrillas could ambush Marine convoys in city streets. As soon as his Marines reached the city, they began taking fire. Colonel Dowdy could not forget the mauling another
regiment had received in Nasiriya, where 17 Marines were killed and another seventy were wounded.
He had to make a choice. His orders were to proceed to al-Kut, but the decision to push through or bypass the town was up to him. However, Colonel Dowdy was receiving mixed signals from his superiors. According to him “there was a lot of confusion”, some officers were recommending an attack, others urged withdrawal.
Colonel Dowdy decided to bypass al-Kut. His regiment would take an alternative route to Baghdad that was safer, but the detour of 170 miles meant that the Marines fell further behind schedule. Colonel Dowdy‘s superiors were
furious with his decision.
After the withdrawal from al-Kut, General Mattis and other staff officers let the Colonel know that his regiment was to make greater speed.
That night on the road to Baghdad, vehicles of the First Marine Regiment were ordered
to drive the highways of Iraq with their headlights on, regardless of security. But their progress was not good enough; the Army‘s Fifth Corps had already reached Baghdad.
Colonel Joe Dowdy was relieved of his command the following day. The Marine Corps will never admit it, but he was fired because he failed to carry out the Corps' most important mission in Iraq: Colonel Dowdy failed to upstage the US Army by being the first to reach Baghdad.
The Marines would return to Iraq one year later, when the First Marine Expeditionary Force assumed responsibility for Al Anbar province, which includes the city of Fallujah.
During the change of command ceremony Lt. Gen. James T. Conway of the I MEF proclaimed that; “Although Marines don’t normally do nation-building, they will tell you that once given the mission, nobody can do it better.”
The Marines took control of the area from the U.S. Army’s 82nd Airborne Division, and they made no secret of their disdain for the Army’s strategy in Iraq.
Before deploying, General Conway had told the New York Times “I don’t envision using that tactic," when asked about Army troops using air strikes against the insurgents. “I don’t want to condemn what [Army] people are doing. I think that they are doing what they think they have to do.”
On March 30, General Conway told a reporter that “There’s no place in our area of operation that we won’t go, and we have taken some casualties in the early going making that point“. The next day four civilian contractors were killed and mutilated in Fallujah, and five Marines also lost their lives.
The Marines sealed off the city and attempted to reassert control over Fallujah, but the insurgents proved to be more determined than expected.
When their patrols came under heavy fire the lightly armed Marines had only two choices: Fight it out with the insurgents on foot, or call in artillery and air strikes. The inevitable result was scores of Marines killed or wounded, and hundreds of civilian casualties.
The world was appalled by the carnage in Fallujah, and the Marines were called off.
While Marines were fighting in Fallujah, the US Army was heavily engaged against militiamen loyal to Muqtata al-Sadr in cities throughout Iraq. But in contrast to the Marine’s failure to recapture Fallujah, the US Army’s heavy armored vehicles could enter hostile cities with impunity. They brought al-Sadr to heel after two months
of fighting, while suffering relatively few casualties.
An uneasy truce was made between the US Army and al-Sadr’s militia, that would last until the Marines again became involved.
On July 31, 2004, the 11th Marine Expeditionary Unit replaced Army units in the holy city of Najaf, headquarters of Muqtata al-Sadr. Just five days later, al-Sadr’s militia would again be waging open war against the US, and the Marines would be calling for reinforcements.
The Marines began skirmishing with al-Sadr’s militiamen as soon as they were given responsibility for Najaf.
After the uprising in April, US Army units had avoided driving past al-Sadr’s house as part of the informal truce, but this would not do for the Marines. The second Shia uprising began after Marines in Najaf provoked al-Sadr by driving their patrols right up to his stronghold.
A firefight ensued, and al-Sadr’s militiamen took up arms in cities throughout Iraq in a replay of the uprising in April.
The Marines had not just picked a fight with Muqtada in Najaf, but they had engaged his militia in an ancient cemetery that abutted the Imam Ali Mosque, Shiite Islam’s holiest shrine. And they did this without informing the Army chain of command, or the Iraqi government.
According to Maj. David Holahan, second in command of the Marine unit in Najaf, “We just did it." But in a replay of the Fallujah assault, the Marines faced an enemy that they were not prepared for. Within hours of launching their attack on August 5, the Marines were pinned down, and requesting assistance.
Unfortunately for the Marines, their rash attack on al-Sadr’s headquarters had sparked another revolt by his militiamen. Army units were once again fighting the Mahdi army in cities throughout Iraq.
When the Army’s Fifth Cavalry Regiment received orders to reinforce the beleaguered Marines, they were deployed against al-Sadr’s militia in the outskirts of Bagdhad, 120 miles away.
The Fifth Cavalry arrived in Najaf after a two day drive through insurgent controlled territory. By then any opportunity to capture al-Sadr had been lost, because the press, and the Islamic world, were focused on the Imam Ali Mosque and the adjacent cemetery. Any attack on Shiite Islam’s holiest shrine, where Muqtata
al-Sadr was holed up, would have had disastrous consequences for the US war effort.
In Fallujah and Najaf, inexperienced Marine units picked fights with insurgents, and in both cases ended up handing the enemy a strategic victory. Their failure to recapture Fallujah made the city a rallying cry for Islamic militarism worldwide, (that is until the second US assault rendered Fallujah uninhabitable).
The Marines' botched attempt to capture Muqtata al-Sadr has only strengthened his hand.
Never Faithful; The Rivalry Between our Army and Marines- By A. Scott Piraino
It's a shame. Both the the Army and Marines are outstanding fighting forces. I don't like to bash another branch. I have a lot of buddies that were in the Marines and are stand up guys. But I will defend my branch to the end.